Figure 1 Poverty and Inequality in Latin America
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the SEDLAC database (Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean) maintained by CEDLAS (Center for Distributional, Labor and Social Studies at the Universidad Nacional de la Plata) and the World Bank, as well as data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. There have also been steady improvements in various nonmonetary measures There have also been steady improvements in various nonmonetary measures of well-being. Between 1990 and 2010, infant mortality in Latin America fell from of well-being. Between 1990 and 2010, infant mortality in Latin America fell from about 120 to 60 deaths per 1,000 live births, maternal mortality fell from 50 to 25 per about 120 to 60 deaths per 1,000 live births, maternal mortality fell from 50 to 25 per 100,000 live births, and chronic malnutrition (or stunting) among children age 5 100,000 live births, and chronic malnutrition (or stunting) among children age 5 and younger fell from 25 percent to 12 percent of the population. As we discuss and younger fell from 25 percent to 12 percent of the population. As we discuss below, there have been continued increases in both school enrollment rates and in below, there have been continued increases in both school enrollment rates and in the mean years of schooling attained. Finally, and of great importance, the health the mean years of schooling attained. Finally, and of great importance, the health and education outcomes of girls in the region are now on par with, or surpass, those and education outcomes of girls in the region are now on par with, or surpass, those of boys. of boys.
Interregional comparisons help to put these achievements in perspective, Interregional comparisons help to put these achievements in perspective, however. Growth rates in Latin America continue to be much lower than in East however. Growth rates in Latin America continue to be much lower than in East Asia-in the 2000s, GDP grew by 10.4 percent per year in China, 7.1 percent in Asia-in the 2000s, GDP grew by 10.4 percent per year in China, 7.1 percent in Vietnam, and 4.1 percent in Korea. At current average growth rates, it will take Vietnam, and 4.1 percent in Korea. At current average growth rates, it will take Brazil 21 years to reach the current GDP per capita of Korea, and Mexico will need Brazil 21 years to reach the current GDP per capita of Korea, and Mexico will need 25 years. Moreover, one can also argue that at least part of the good growth perfor-25 years. Moreover, one can also argue that at least part of the good growth performance observed in the last decade is the result of an old-fashioned commodity mance observed in the last decade is the result of an old-fashioned commodity boom associated with growth in Asia and, at least through 2008, unusually favorboom associated with growth in Asia and, at least through 2008, unusually favorable circumstances in international capital markets. Figure 2 compares total able circumstances in international capital markets. Figure 2 compares total factor productivity growth in East Asia, Latin America, and the United States from factor productivity growth in East Asia, Latin America, and the United States from 1980 to 2007: in East Asia, productivity growth has been faster than in the United 1980 to 2007: in East Asia, productivity growth has been faster than in the United States, while in Latin America it was negative up to 2000 (IDB 2010) . Since then, States, while in Latin America it was negative up to 2000 (IDB 2010) . Since then,
Figure 2 Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in Latin America and East Asia
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Daude and Fernández-Arias (2010) . Notes: Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela. East Asia: Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. East Asia productivity growth has been similar in Latin America and the United States, but productivity growth has been similar in Latin America and the United States, but the region has continued to lose ground relative to East Asia. the region has continued to lose ground relative to East Asia.
In parallel, savings and investments rates in the region continue to be very In parallel, savings and investments rates in the region continue to be very low relative to those observed in Asia. Savings rates in Latin America range from low relative to those observed in Asia. Savings rates in Latin America range from 18 percent of GDP (in Brazil) to 24 percent (in Mexico and Chile), which contrasts 18 percent of GDP (in Brazil) to 24 percent (in Mexico and Chile), which contrasts with 31 percent in India, 34 percent in Malaysia, and 51 percent in China. And, with 31 percent in India, 34 percent in Malaysia, and 51 percent in China. And, despite recent gains, Latin America continues to be the most unequal region of the despite recent gains, Latin America continues to be the most unequal region of the world and, because of this, is characterized by poverty rates that are much higher world and, because of this, is characterized by poverty rates that are much higher than one would expect given the region's income level. than one would expect given the region's income level. For growth to be both faster and more equitable, Latin America needs to focus For growth to be both faster and more equitable, Latin America needs to focus sharply on accelerating productivity growth; on raising its savings rate to sustain a sharply on accelerating productivity growth; on raising its savings rate to sustain a larger investment effort (particularly in infrastructure); on increasing the human larger investment effort (particularly in infrastructure); on increasing the human capital of its workforce; and on new policies to reduce inequality. capital of its workforce; and on new policies to reduce inequality.
In this paper, we focus on a subset of these issues. In particular, we argue In this paper, we focus on a subset of these issues. In particular, we argue that social policy, including human capital and education, social insurance, and that social policy, including human capital and education, social insurance, and redistribution, need special attention if Latin America's achievements over the last redistribution, need special attention if Latin America's achievements over the last two decades are to be sustained and amplifi ed. Starting in the mid 1990s, many two decades are to be sustained and amplifi ed. Starting in the mid 1990s, many governments in the region introduced a variety of programs, including noncontribgovernments in the region introduced a variety of programs, including noncontributory pensions and health insurance, and cash transfers targeted to the poor. Social utory pensions and health insurance, and cash transfers targeted to the poor. Social spending in Latin America increased sharply. A growing political and technocratic spending in Latin America increased sharply. A growing political and technocratic consensus developed around the need for policies to ensure that the poor have consensus developed around the need for policies to ensure that the poor have a minimum income fl oor, are protected from various risks, and have the human a minimum income fl oor, are protected from various risks, and have the human capital that will allow them (or their children) to escape poverty. These policies capital that will allow them (or their children) to escape poverty. These policies have been widely praised and, like others, we believe they have resulted in substanhave been widely praised and, like others, we believe they have resulted in substantial improvements in the lives of the poor in the region. However, a more nuanced tial improvements in the lives of the poor in the region. However, a more nuanced view shows some worrisome trends. Moving forward, we believe it is necessary to view shows some worrisome trends. Moving forward, we believe it is necessary to pay much closer attention to the quality of services, particularly in education; to the pay much closer attention to the quality of services, particularly in education; to the incentives generated by the interplay of some programs, particularly in the labor incentives generated by the interplay of some programs, particularly in the labor market; to a more balanced intertemporal distribution of benefi ts, particularly market; to a more balanced intertemporal distribution of benefi ts, particularly between young and old; and to sustainable sources of fi nance, particularly to the between young and old; and to sustainable sources of fi nance, particularly to the link between contributions and benefi ts. link between contributions and benefi ts.
An important caveat is in order before we begin: Latin America is a An important caveat is in order before we begin: Latin America is a heterogeneous region. Countries differ in size, income levels, institutions, and heterogeneous region. Countries differ in size, income levels, institutions, and endowments. What follows are broad strokes that may not always apply to all counendowments. What follows are broad strokes that may not always apply to all countries, and any implications for policy would have to be scrutinized and adapted to tries, and any implications for policy would have to be scrutinized and adapted to specifi c circumstances. specifi c circumstances.
Schooling
Latin America has an impressive record of expanding the coverage of basic Latin America has an impressive record of expanding the coverage of basic education. Net enrollment rates, given by the fraction of children who are enrolled education. Net enrollment rates, given by the fraction of children who are enrolled at the appropriate level for their age, now exceed 90 percent in primary school at the appropriate level for their age, now exceed 90 percent in primary school and are between 60 and 80 percent in secondary school in most countries. Broadly and are between 60 and 80 percent in secondary school in most countries. Broadly speaking, countries in the region have enrollment rates that are similar to those speaking, countries in the region have enrollment rates that are similar to those of other countries with similar income levels (Inter-American Development Bank of other countries with similar income levels (Inter-American Development Bank 2011). On average, individuals born in 1945 in Latin America completed six grades 2011). On average, individuals born in 1945 in Latin America completed six grades of schooling, while those born in 1985 have completed ten grades. of schooling, while those born in 1985 have completed ten grades.
Unfortunately, increases in schooling levels have not been accompanied by Unfortunately, increases in schooling levels have not been accompanied by increases in quality. The performance of Latin American students on standardincreases in quality. The performance of Latin American students on standardized tests is dismal. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and ized tests is dismal. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay participated in the International Programme for International Student Uruguay participated in the International Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), which tested competencies in language, mathematics, and Assessment (PISA), which tested competencies in language, mathematics, and science for 15 year-olds. Their scores are relatively similar to each other, with Chile science for 15 year-olds. Their scores are relatively similar to each other, with Chile and Uruguay performing somewhat better and Panama and Peru somewhat worse. and Uruguay performing somewhat better and Panama and Peru somewhat worse. However, students in Panama score below those in Indonesia, even though GDP per However, students in Panama score below those in Indonesia, even though GDP per capita in Indonesia is about one-third that in Panama, and those in Argentina have capita in Indonesia is about one-third that in Panama, and those in Argentina have scores that are approximately 100 points (one standard deviation) below those in scores that are approximately 100 points (one standard deviation) below those in Poland. Only 5 percent of Chilean students score at or above the median score of Poland. Only 5 percent of Chilean students score at or above the median score of students in Singapore, and only 1.5 percent score at or above the median of students students in Singapore, and only 1.5 percent score at or above the median of students in Shanghai, as shown in Figure 3 ; the same is true of Uruguay. Even children in the in Shanghai, as shown in Figure 3 ; the same is true of Uruguay. Even children in the best schools in the region appear to perform poorly. We calculated the PISA math best schools in the region appear to perform poorly. We calculated the PISA math scores limiting the sample to the 10 percent best-performing schools that particiscores limiting the sample to the 10 percent best-performing schools that participated in this test in Chile and Uruguay, and found that only 10 percent of children pated in this test in Chile and Uruguay, and found that only 10 percent of children in these high-performing schools in Chile, and 13 percent in Uruguay, have scores as in these high-performing schools in Chile, and 13 percent in Uruguay, have scores as high as the average child in Shanghai. Moreover, such comparisons likely understate high as the average child in Shanghai. Moreover, such comparisons likely understate the differences across countries, because the PISA only tests 15-year-old children the differences across countries, because the PISA only tests 15-year-old children currently enrolled in 7th grade or above, and grade repetition and dropout rates are currently enrolled in 7th grade or above, and grade repetition and dropout rates are higher in Latin America than in East Asia. higher in Latin America than in East Asia.
There is a broad consensus among policymakers and researchers that the There is a broad consensus among policymakers and researchers that the very low performance of Latin American students on standardized tests has negavery low performance of Latin American students on standardized tests has negative implications for productivity. A simple accounting exercise by Hanushek and tive implications for productivity. A simple accounting exercise by Hanushek and Woessman (2012) suggests that at least half of the Latin American low-growth Woessman (2012) suggests that at least half of the Latin American low-growth "puzzle" can be attributed to low levels of cognitive skills among students, as "puzzle" can be attributed to low levels of cognitive skills among students, as measured by test scores. Further, because poor children in Latin America generally measured by test scores. Further, because poor children in Latin America generally attend lower-quality schools than their better-off counterparts, it also has negative attend lower-quality schools than their better-off counterparts, it also has negative implications for equity. implications for equity.
Why do Latin American students perform so poorly on international tests? Why do Latin American students perform so poorly on international tests? Two reasons are particularly important: factors that affect children before they Two reasons are particularly important: factors that affect children before they enter school, and the poor quality of teachers. In the region, many children arrive at enter school, and the poor quality of teachers. In the region, many children arrive at the beginning of formal schooling with serious defi cits in health and development. the beginning of formal schooling with serious defi cits in health and development. Rates of chronic malnutrition (low height-for-age, or stunting) are very high in some Rates of chronic malnutrition (low height-for-age, or stunting) are very high in some countries, especially among the poor. In Guatemala, more than half the children countries, especially among the poor. In Guatemala, more than half the children under the age of fi ve are more than two standard deviations behind in height, relaunder the age of fi ve are more than two standard deviations behind in height, relative to a reference population of well-nourished children. In Bolivia, Ecuador, and tive to a reference population of well-nourished children. In Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, the number is between 20 and 30 percent, but among the poorest households, Peru, the number is between 20 and 30 percent, but among the poorest households, especially those in rural areas, the fraction is more than double. Poor nutritional especially those in rural areas, the fraction is more than double. Poor nutritional status in early childhood has serious implications for cognitive functioning, and the status in early childhood has serious implications for cognitive functioning, and the damage may be largely irreversible. damage may be largely irreversible.
Other indicators also suggest that poor Latin American children begin schooling Other indicators also suggest that poor Latin American children begin schooling already behind. Schady et al. (2012) show that, by the time they enter school, the already behind. Schady et al. (2012) show that, by the time they enter school, the poorest children in rural Chile are about two-thirds of a standard deviation behind poorest children in rural Chile are about two-thirds of a standard deviation behind where they should be on their performance on a test (the Spanish-speaking version where they should be on their performance on a test (the Spanish-speaking version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test) that has been shown to be highly predictive of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test) that has been shown to be highly predictive of school failure; in Colombia and Ecuador these delays are about one-and-a-half of school failure; in Colombia and Ecuador these delays are about one-and-a-half standard deviations; and in Nicaragua and Peru, the poorest children in rural standard deviations; and in Nicaragua and Peru, the poorest children in rural areas are more than two standard deviations behind, which implies delays of about areas are more than two standard deviations behind, which implies delays of about two years in their cognitive development. two years in their cognitive development.
Although the evidence from Latin America is sparse, there seems to be Although the evidence from Latin America is sparse, there seems to be considerable scope for interventions targeted at young children-especially those considerable scope for interventions targeted at young children-especially those in poor households, who exhibit the biggest delays (see Schady 2012 and Vegas in poor households, who exhibit the biggest delays (see Schady 2012 and Vegas and Santibañez 2010 for reviews) . In Argentina, children in cohorts and regions and Santibañez 2010 for reviews). In Argentina, children in cohorts and regions that were exposed to a preschool program have test scores in third grade that are that were exposed to a preschool program have test scores in third grade that are 0.23 standard deviations higher than those who were not exposed, have fewer 0.23 standard deviations higher than those who were not exposed, have fewer behavior problems and are more likely to pay attention in class and participate behavior problems and are more likely to pay attention in class and participate (Berlinski, Galiani, and Gertler 2009) . In Uruguay, plausibly exogenous variation (Berlinski, Galiani, and Gertler 2009) . In Uruguay, plausibly exogenous variation in access to preschool is associated with 0.8 more years of completed schooling in access to preschool is associated with 0.8 more years of completed schooling by the time children are 15 years of age (Berlinski, Galiani, and Manacorda by the time children are 15 years of age (Berlinski, Galiani, and Manacorda 2008) . In Colombia, a pilot home-visiting and parenting program improved 2008). In Colombia, a pilot home-visiting and parenting program improved cognitive development among young children by about 0.3 standard deviacognitive development among young children by about 0.3 standard deviations (Attanasio, Fitzsimons, Granthan-McGregor, Meghir , and Rubio-Codina tions (Attanasio, Fitzsimons, Granthan-McGregor, Meghir, and Rubio-Codina 2012). 2012) .
3 3 In Guatemala, a program that distributed a high-protein energy drink In Guatemala, a program that distributed a high-protein energy drink known as known as Atole to poor children in early childhood improved chronic malnutrito poor children in early childhood improved chronic malnutrition, schooling, test scores, and men's wages almost 20 years later (Behrman, tion, schooling, test scores, and men's wages almost 20 years later (Behrman, Calderon, Preston, Hoddinott, Martorell, and Stein 2009; Hoddinott, Maluccio, Calderon, Preston, Hoddinott, Martorell, and Stein 2009; Hoddinott, Maluccio, Behrman, Flores, and Martorell 2008; Maluccio, Hoddinott, Behrman, Martorell, Behrman, Flores, and Martorell 2008; Maluccio, Hoddinott, Behrman, Martorell, Quisumbing, and Stein 2009 Metzler and Woessman (2012) estimate that higher levels of Using data for Peru, Metzler and Woessman (2012) estimate that higher levels of teacher content knowledge in language and (especially) math translate into better teacher content knowledge in language and (especially) math translate into better learning outcomes for children. In Chile, in any given year, roughly one-third of learning outcomes for children. In Chile, in any given year, roughly one-third of teachers are deemed to have unsatisfactory performance on the performance evaluteachers are deemed to have unsatisfactory performance on the performance evaluation system known as ation system known as Docente Más. In Ecuador, the Classroom Assessment Scoring . In Ecuador, the Classroom Assessment Scoring System (CLASS), a measure of the quality of teaching practices which focuses System (CLASS), a measure of the quality of teaching practices which focuses on socioemotional support, classroom management, and instructional support on socioemotional support, classroom management, and instructional support provided by teachers (Mashburn, Downer, Hamre, Justice, and Pianta 2010 ; Pianta provided by teachers (Mashburn, Downer, Hamre, Justice, and Pianta 2010; Pianta 2011; Pianta and Hamre 2009 ) was applied to a sample of teachers between fi rst and 2011; Pianta and Hamre 2009) was applied to a sample of teachers between fi rst and third grade. Roughly 90 percent received the lowest possible score of 1, on a scale third grade. Roughly 90 percent received the lowest possible score of 1, on a scale of 1 to 7, in terms of the instructional support they provide (Araujo, Cruz-Aguayo, of 1 to 7, in terms of the instructional support they provide (Araujo, Cruz-Aguayo, and Schady 2012) . In Chile, teacher scores are somewhat better than in Ecuador, and Schady 2012) . In Chile, teacher scores are somewhat better than in Ecuador, but only marginally so (Yoshikawa et al. 2012) . but only marginally so (Yoshikawa et al. 2012) .
In sum, advances in schooling coverage in Latin America are welcome, but In sum, advances in schooling coverage in Latin America are welcome, but are clearly not enough. The interplay of defi ciencies generated at an early age with are clearly not enough. The interplay of defi ciencies generated at an early age with poor-quality teachers and at times inadequate facilities and content implies that poor-quality teachers and at times inadequate facilities and content implies that children in Latin America, particularly poor ones, are not learning enough and children in Latin America, particularly poor ones, are not learning enough and enter the labor market with substantial disadvantages relative to their peers in other enter the labor market with substantial disadvantages relative to their peers in other parts of the world. This is clearly a weak platform from which to improve producparts of the world. This is clearly a weak platform from which to improve productivity and reduce the intergenerational transmission of inequality. tivity and reduce the intergenerational transmission of inequality.
4

Social Insurance
Social insurance aims to protect households against risks-ill health, unemSocial insurance aims to protect households against risks-ill health, unemployment, disability, death, or poverty in old age (the latter associated with ployment, disability, death, or poverty in old age (the latter associated with uncertainty about longevity)-and to contribute to intertemporal consumption uncertainty about longevity)-and to contribute to intertemporal consumption smoothing. The central feature of social insurance in most of Latin America is that smoothing. The central feature of social insurance in most of Latin America is that both the provision and the fi nancing are a function of labor status: in particular, both the provision and the fi nancing are a function of labor status: in particular, whether a worker is salaried (having a boss and receiving payment in the form of whether a worker is salaried (having a boss and receiving payment in the form of wages) or nonsalaried (self-employed, working on a piece-rate basis, or working wages) or nonsalaried (self-employed, working on a piece-rate basis, or working in a family fi rm). As a result, social insurance is intertwined with the functioning in a family fi rm). As a result, social insurance is intertwined with the functioning of the labor market, with broad implications for the effi cacy of these programs, of the labor market, with broad implications for the effi cacy of these programs, as well as for domestic savings and for productivity (Levy 2008 ; Ferreira and as well as for domestic savings and for productivity (Levy 2008; Ferreira and Robalino 2011) . Robalino 2011).
In most counties in Latin America, salaried workers are entitled to a bundle In most counties in Latin America, salaried workers are entitled to a bundle of benefi ts including, among others, health, work-risk, death and disability insurof benefi ts including, among others, health, work-risk, death and disability insurance, and retirement pensions, and sometimes other benefi ts like child allowances ance, and retirement pensions, and sometimes other benefi ts like child allowances (Argentina), labor training services (Colombia), or housing and daycare services (Argentina) , labor training services (Colombia), or housing and daycare services (Mexico). These benefi ts are paid from wage taxes. The bundle and the method (Mexico). These benefi ts are paid from wage taxes. The bundle and the method of fi nancing are usually referred to as "contributory social insurance." In addition, of fi nancing are usually referred to as "contributory social insurance." In addition, salaried workers are protected against loss of employment through legal requiresalaried workers are protected against loss of employment through legal requirements for severance pay and related indemnities. ments for severance pay and related indemnities.
5 5 In what follows, contributory In what follows, contributory social insurance should be understood as encompassing employment protection social insurance should be understood as encompassing employment protection regulations, and health, pensions, and other benefi ts, as fi rms and workers must regulations, and health, pensions, and other benefi ts, as fi rms and workers must internalize the costs of all these items. internalize the costs of all these items.
In practice, because regulations are imperfectly enforced, fi rms sometimes In practice, because regulations are imperfectly enforced, fi rms sometimes evade and hire salaried workers illegally; and because not all workers participate evade and hire salaried workers illegally; and because not all workers participate in the market as salaried employees, contributory social insurance only covers a in the market as salaried employees, contributory social insurance only covers a subset of the labor force, in what is commonly referred to as "formal employment." subset of the labor force, in what is commonly referred to as "formal employment." Figure 4 shows that the share of the labor force covered by contributory social insur- Figure 4 shows that the share of the labor force covered by contributory social insurance is below 50 percent in most countries in the region, despite the fact that these ance is below 50 percent in most countries in the region, despite the fact that these programs have been obligatory for over half a century. programs have been obligatory for over half a century.
Until relatively recently, nonsalaried and illegally hired salaried workers -in Until relatively recently, nonsalaried and illegally hired salaried workers -in what is commonly referred to as "informal employment"-were not covered by what is commonly referred to as "informal employment"-were not covered by social insurance in Latin America. Many countries had some publicly provided social insurance in Latin America. Many countries had some publicly provided health care for all, regardless of salaried status, but it was largely limited to basic health care for all, regardless of salaried status, but it was largely limited to basic interventions for maternal and child health. However, over the last two decades, interventions for maternal and child health. However, over the last two decades, governments across Latin America have created or expanded health, pension, and governments across Latin America have created or expanded health, pension, and related programs that are paid from general revenues and thus are referred to as related programs that are paid from general revenues and thus are referred to as "noncontributory social insurance." "noncontributory social insurance."
These noncontributory social insurance programs have grown rapidly These noncontributory social insurance programs have grown rapidly in terms of budget and coverage. Table 1 lists 13 countries in the region with in terms of budget and coverage. Table 1 
found in Peru and Nicaragua and, with some variations, in Argentina, Bolivia, found in Peru and Nicaragua and, with some variations, in Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Colombia introduced its and Ecuador. Colombia introduced its Régimen Subsidiado en Salud in the early in the early 1990s, initially providing benefi ts of lower quality to informal workers relative to 1990s, initially providing benefi ts of lower quality to informal workers relative to those offered to formal workers through the those offered to formal workers through the Régimen Contributivo. Mexico had . Mexico had offered free health services to informal workers through various programs since offered free health services to informal workers through various programs since the 1980s, but in 2003 launched a major effort to expand coverage through the the 1980s, but in 2003 launched a major effort to expand coverage through the Seguro Popular. . These noncontributory programs have substantially expanded the coverage These noncontributory programs have substantially expanded the coverage of pensions and health insurance. In Brazil's of pensions and health insurance. In Brazil's Previdência Rural pension program, pension program, coverage among those eligible increased by 40 percentage points within a decade, coverage among those eligible increased by 40 percentage points within a decade, from a pre-reform level of about 13 percent (Bosch, Cobacho, and Pages forthfrom a pre-reform level of about 13 percent (Bosch, Cobacho, and Pages forthcoming; Carvalho Filho 2008 coverage of health insurance from levels below 30 percent to more than 90 percent coverage of health insurance from levels below 30 percent to more than 90 percent today (Camacho, Conover, and Hoyos 2012) . today (Camacho, Conover, and Hoyos 2012) . By extending coverage, noncontributory social insurance programs provide By extending coverage, noncontributory social insurance programs provide some protection against risks to households who would otherwise be unprotected. some protection against risks to households who would otherwise be unprotected. In Mexico, the In Mexico, the Seguro Popular decreased participants' catastrophic health expendidecreased participants' catastrophic health expenditures by 23 percent tures by 23 percent (King et al. 2009 ), and the (King et al. 2009) , and the 70 y Más program, which provides program, which provides pensions for those 70 years or older, reduced the poverty gap among recipients from pensions for those 70 years or older, reduced the poverty gap among recipients from 0.61 to 0.46 . Papers that have modeled the likely effect 0.61 to 0.46 . Papers that have modeled the likely effect of the 2008 pension reform in Chile, which introduced a noncontributory pension of the 2008 pension reform in Chile, which introduced a noncontributory pension for the poorest 60 percent of the population, also conclude that it will substantially for the poorest 60 percent of the population, also conclude that it will substantially reduce poverty (Attanasio, Meghir, and Otero 2011; Todd and Joubert 2011) . In reduce poverty (Attanasio, Meghir, and Otero 2011; Todd and Joubert 2011) . In other cases, the declines in income poverty are smaller because noncontributory other cases, the declines in income poverty are smaller because noncontributory pensions allow a larger share of the elderly to stop working (for evidence from pensions allow a larger share of the elderly to stop working (for evidence from Brazil, see Carvalho Filho 2008; for evidence from Mexico, see Galiani and Gertler Brazil, see Carvalho Filho 2008 ; for evidence from Mexico, see Galiani and Gertler 2009; Juárez and Pfutze 2012). 2009; Juárez and Pfutze 2012) .
Without minimizing these accomplishments, noncontributory social insurWithout minimizing these accomplishments, noncontributory social insurance programs do raise various concerns. First, noncontributory programs can be ance programs do raise various concerns. First, noncontributory programs can be expensive. For example, in the Brazilian expensive. For example, in the Brazilian Previdência Rural program, the value of the program, the value of the pension is large (equivalent to roughly one-third of per capita GDP), and the eligipension is large (equivalent to roughly one-third of per capita GDP), and the eligibility age low (60 years for men, 55 for women). As a result, the cost is high, about bility age low (60 years for men, 55 for women). As a result, the cost is high, about 0.89 percent of GDP, even though only workers in rural areas are eligible for the 0.89 percent of GDP, even though only workers in rural areas are eligible for the program. The Argentinean program. The Argentinean Moratorium cost between 1.5 and 2 percentage points of cost between 1.5 and 2 percentage points of GDP in the year it was implemented. Moreover, because Latin America's population GDP in the year it was implemented. Moreover, because Latin America's population is aging rapidly, the costs of noncontributory programs could increase substantially is aging rapidly, the costs of noncontributory programs could increase substantially in the coming decades. The fraction of the population 65 and over in the Latin in the coming decades. The fraction of the population 65 and over in the Latin America is projected to increase from 7.6 percent of total population in 2010, to America is projected to increase from 7.6 percent of total population in 2010, to 21 percent in 2050; by 2050 there are projected to be three working-age individuals 21 percent in 2050; by 2050 there are projected to be three working-age individuals for every person age 65 and older, compared to 8.5 in 2010 (ECLAC 2011). These for every person age 65 and older, compared to 8.5 in 2010 (ECLAC 2011). These programs can therefore impose large future liabilities. A related political economy programs can therefore impose large future liabilities. A related political economy concern is that noncontributory programs face ongoing pressure for increases in concern is that noncontributory programs face ongoing pressure for increases in coverage and benefi ts, because unlike contributory programs, benefi ts and contricoverage and benefi ts, because unlike contributory programs, benefi ts and contributions are not directly linked. For example, in 2007 Mexico's butions are not directly linked. For example, in 2007 Mexico's 70 y Más program program only covered elderly above age 70 living in towns with less than 2,500 inhabitants; in only covered elderly above age 70 living in towns with less than 2,500 inhabitants; in 2008, it was expanded to include towns with less than 20,000; in 2009, to towns with 2008, it was expanded to include towns with less than 20,000; in 2009, to towns with less than 30,000; in 2012, an election year, eligibility was extended to all, regardless less than 30,000; in 2012, an election year, eligibility was extended to all, regardless of place of residence; and in 2013, the eligibility age was reduced to 65. A similar of place of residence; and in 2013, the eligibility age was reduced to 65. A similar situation occurred in Colombia, where the health package fi nanced by the situation occurred in Colombia, where the health package fi nanced by the Régimen Subsidiado (for informal workers) was initially less generous than that offered by (for informal workers) was initially less generous than that offered by the the Régimen Contributivo (for formal workers). In 2008, however, the Constitutional (for formal workers). In 2008, however, the Constitutional Court required that the package of health benefi ts in the two programs be equated. Court required that the package of health benefi ts in the two programs be equated.
The provision of noncontributory social insurance programs can also discourage The provision of noncontributory social insurance programs can also discourage formal employment, because informal workers receive benefi ts without paying for formal employment, because informal workers receive benefi ts without paying for them in the form of a wage tax. In 2009, Argentina extended to informal workers them in the form of a wage tax. In 2009, Argentina extended to informal workers the subsidy for minors less than 18 years of age, previously paid only to formal the subsidy for minors less than 18 years of age, previously paid only to formal workers, through a program known as the workers, through a program known as the Asignación Universal por Hijo. . 6 6 By 2011, By 2011, the program covered 29 percent of all eligible minors at a cost of 0.64 percent of the program covered 29 percent of all eligible minors at a cost of 0.64 percent of GDP. Garganta and Gasparini (2012) estimate that this program reduced the prob-GDP. Garganta and Gasparini (2012) estimate that this program reduced the probability that informal workers would enter into formal employment by 45 percent ability that informal workers would enter into formal employment by 45 percent for women and 30 percent for men. Bosch and Campos (2010) analyze the impact for women and 30 percent for men. Bosch and Campos (2010) 4 and 1 percentage points of total employment from formal to informal jobs, which is equivalent to between 160,000 and ment from formal to informal jobs, which is equivalent to between 160,000 and 400,000 workers, or between 8 and 20 percent of the total formal jobs created during 400,000 workers, or between 8 and 20 percent of the total formal jobs created during that period. The analysis by Camacho et al. (2012) of Colombia's that period. The analysis by Camacho et al. (2012) of Colombia's Regimen Subsidiado suggests qualitatively similar, but substantially larger effects on informality, about suggests qualitatively similar, but substantially larger effects on informality, about 4 percentage points. 4 percentage points.
More broadly, the segmentation of social insurance into contributory and More broadly, the segmentation of social insurance into contributory and noncontributory components has three important implications: 1) it reduces the noncontributory components has three important implications: 1) it reduces the overall effi cacy of insurance; 2) it may reduce domestic savings; and 3) it misaloverall effi cacy of insurance; 2) it may reduce domestic savings; and 3) it misallocates resources, which can have negative impacts on productivity and growth. We locates resources, which can have negative impacts on productivity and growth. We will say a few words about each effect. will say a few words about each effect.
The effi cacy of insurance is reduced because, across Latin America, transitions The effi cacy of insurance is reduced because, across Latin America, transitions from formal to informal employment and back are frequent. In any given year in from formal to informal employment and back are frequent. In any given year in Argentina and Brazil, 25 and 47 percent of informal workers transit into a formal Argentina and Brazil, 25 and 47 percent of informal workers transit into a formal job, respectively, while 9 and 7 percent transit in the other direction (Ribe, Robalino, job, respectively, while 9 and 7 percent transit in the other direction (Ribe, Robalino, and Walker 2012) . Because workers only accumulate pension benefi ts when they and Walker 2012). Because workers only accumulate pension benefi ts when they are formally employed, contribution densities to pension plans are low. Even in are formally employed, contribution densities to pension plans are low. Even in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, three of the countries with the highest coverage Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, three of the countries with the highest coverage of contributory social insurance in the region (as shown earlier in Figure 4) , mean of contributory social insurance in the region (as shown earlier in Figure 4 ), mean contribution densities are low at 55 percent, 47 percent, and 58 percent, respectively contribution densities are low at 55 percent, 47 percent, and 58 percent, respectively (Forteza, Luchetti, and Pallares 2009). As a result, the replacement rate, the amount (Forteza, Luchetti, and Pallares 2009). As a result, the replacement rate, the amount of before-retirement income replaced by the pension, will be low, and contributory of before-retirement income replaced by the pension, will be low, and contributory pensions will do a poor job helping individuals to smooth consumption between pensions will do a poor job helping individuals to smooth consumption between work and retirement. Also, transits between formal and informal employment result work and retirement. Also, transits between formal and informal employment result in erratic coverage against risks that are only covered by contributory social insurin erratic coverage against risks that are only covered by contributory social insurance (like death, disability, and loss of employment). ance (like death, disability, and loss of employment).
In terms of effects on saving, many countries in Latin America reformed their In terms of effects on saving, many countries in Latin America reformed their pension systems in the 1990s, often replacing defi ned benefi t with defi ned contribupension systems in the 1990s, often replacing defi ned benefi t with defi ned contribution programs (Uthoff 2011) . One goal of these reforms was to increase the supply tion programs (Uthoff 2011) . One goal of these reforms was to increase the supply of long-term domestic savings denominated in local currency. Although mandating of long-term domestic savings denominated in local currency. Although mandating increased pension savings can in principle be offset by reduced private saving, the increased pension savings can in principle be offset by reduced private saving, the balance of the available evidence from Latin America shows that this offset has not balance of the available evidence from Latin America shows that this offset has not occurred on a one-to-one basis, implying that forced savings through contributory occurred on a one-to-one basis, implying that forced savings through contributory pensions have increased domestic savings (Aguila 2011; Carpio 2008; Cerda 2008 ; pensions have increased domestic savings (Aguila 2011; Carpio 2008; Cerda 2008; Quintanilla 2011) . However, because the coverage of contributory pensions is so Quintanilla 2011). However, because the coverage of contributory pensions is so limited, the contribution of these programs to national saving is also limited. The limited, the contribution of these programs to national saving is also limited. The extension of noncontributory pension programs is likely to further undermine indiextension of noncontributory pension programs is likely to further undermine individual incentives to save through the contributory system. vidual incentives to save through the contributory system.
Finally, the segmentation of social insurance may be a factor behind the stagFinally, the segmentation of social insurance may be a factor behind the stagnation of productivity growth in the region. On the one hand, if benefi ts from nation of productivity growth in the region. On the one hand, if benefi ts from contributory social insurance are not fully valued by workers, contributory programs contributory social insurance are not fully valued by workers, contributory programs act like a tax on formal employment. act like a tax on formal employment. 7 7 On the other hand, noncontributory social On the other hand, noncontributory social insurance programs function as a subsidy to informal employment because insurance programs function as a subsidy to informal employment because informal workers receive at least some of the same benefi ts as formal workers, informal workers receive at least some of the same benefi ts as formal workers, with the critical difference that they do not pay for them from foregone wages. with the critical difference that they do not pay for them from foregone wages. Moreover, when contributory social insurance and regulations are imperfectly Moreover, when contributory social insurance and regulations are imperfectly enforced, fi rms may hire salaried workers illegally but remain ineffi ciently small enforced, fi rms may hire salaried workers illegally but remain ineffi ciently small to minimize the chance of detection. Taken together, these taxes and subsidies to minimize the chance of detection. Taken together, these taxes and subsidies distort the price of labor towards more small fi rms with salaried labor, more family distort the price of labor towards more small fi rms with salaried labor, more family fi rms with nonsalaried labor, and more informal employment. In Mexico, Busso, fi rms with nonsalaried labor, and more informal employment. In Mexico, Busso, Fazio, and fi nd that 90 percent of the 3.6 million fi rms captured in the Fazio, and fi nd that 90 percent of the 3.6 million fi rms captured in the Census have up to fi ve workers, 96 percent up to ten, and only 1 percent more than Census have up to fi ve workers, 96 percent up to ten, and only 1 percent more than 50; but less than three in four fi rms are registered with the Social Security Institute 50; but less than three in four fi rms are registered with the Social Security Institute (a prerequisite for formality). (a prerequisite for formality).
8 8 An emerging literature shows that productivity in An emerging literature shows that productivity in the informal sector is lower than in the formal one, so any resource movements the informal sector is lower than in the formal one, so any resource movements from the former to the latter will tend to lower aggregate productivity (Fajnzylber, from the former to the latter will tend to lower aggregate productivity (Fajnzylber, Maloney, and 7 The evidence on this point for Latin America is mixed. Important references include Almeida and Carneiro (2012) , Bergolo and Cruces (2012) , Cruces, Galiani, and Kidyba (2010) , Gruber (1997) , Kugler and Kugler (2009), and Levy (2008) . 8 Moreover, this count probably overstates the share of larger fi rms, because the Census only accounts for about 50 percent of private employment. The rest of private employment is either self-employment, or occurs in small fi rms not captured by the Census, like street stands or street markets. Firms in Latin America may choose to be ineffi ciently small (from a social point of view) for a variety of reasons, in addition to the incentive to avoid social insurance regulations. For example, many countries have special tax regimes whereby smaller fi rms face substantially lower rates of value-added or income taxes (Pagés 2010).
In sum, over a half century after they were introduced, contributory social In sum, over a half century after they were introduced, contributory social insurance programs across Latin America provide only low levels of coverage, espeinsurance programs across Latin America provide only low levels of coverage, especially among the poor. The noncontributory social insurance programs introduced cially among the poor. The noncontributory social insurance programs introduced over the last two decades have extended a measure of protection against some risks over the last two decades have extended a measure of protection against some risks to those who would otherwise be uncovered, and they have also led to substantial to those who would otherwise be uncovered, and they have also led to substantial reductions in poverty among the elderly. However, the interplay of these two systems reductions in poverty among the elderly. However, the interplay of these two systems distorts incentives in the labor market and generates costly trade-offs between distorts incentives in the labor market and generates costly trade-offs between extending the coverage of social insurance, on the one hand, and productivity, extending the coverage of social insurance, on the one hand, and productivity, savings, and fi scal considerations, on the other. savings, and fi scal considerations, on the other.
Inequality and Social Assistance
Countries in Latin America have experienced highly unequal distributions of Countries in Latin America have experienced highly unequal distributions of income since at least the middle of the nineteenth century, if not before. income since at least the middle of the nineteenth century, if not before.
9 9 Inequality Inequality in the region appears to have been particularly high in the 1980s -a result of in the region appears to have been particularly high in the 1980s -a result of numerous macroeconomic crises and the adjustment processes that followed numerous macroeconomic crises and the adjustment processes that followed (Gasparini and Lustig 2011; Gasparini, Cruces, and Tornarolli 2011; López-Calva (Gasparini and Lustig 2011; Gasparini, Cruces, and Tornarolli 2011; López-Calva and Lustig 2010) . But the last decade has seen substantial reductions in inequality. and Lustig 2010) . But the last decade has seen substantial reductions in inequality. Moreover, inequality fell in countries with different political orientations, with relaMoreover, inequality fell in countries with different political orientations, with relatively large and small governments, with large and small shares of social spending, tively large and small governments, with large and small shares of social spending, and with historically high and low levels of inequality. For this reason, the search and with historically high and low levels of inequality. For this reason, the search for causes of the inequality decline in Latin America has focused on broad trends for causes of the inequality decline in Latin America has focused on broad trends cutting across the region. cutting across the region.
Decompositions suggest there are two main explanations for the decline in Decompositions suggest there are two main explanations for the decline in inequality in the region in the last decade: A reduction in the wage premium for inequality in the region in the last decade: A reduction in the wage premium for skilled labor, and increases in the coverage of social programs. The rate of return to skilled labor, and increases in the coverage of social programs. The rate of return to schooling in the region increased in the 1980s and 1990s, but fell in the 2000s. As a schooling in the region increased in the 1980s and 1990s, but fell in the 2000s. As a result, the share of labor income at the bottom of the distribution increased, which result, the share of labor income at the bottom of the distribution increased, which accounts for between one-third and one-half of the inequality decline. Meanwhile, accounts for between one-third and one-half of the inequality decline. Meanwhile, the expansion in pension coverage (mainly noncontributory pensions, although the expansion in pension coverage (mainly noncontributory pensions, although data limitations often make it diffi cult to separate contributory and noncontribudata limitations often make it diffi cult to separate contributory and noncontributory pensions in household surveys) accounts for maybe 5 percent of the decline, tory pensions in household surveys) accounts for maybe 5 percent of the decline, and programs that make cash transfers to the poor account for roughly one-quarter and programs that make cash transfers to the poor account for roughly one-quarter of the decline. of the decline. 10 10 9 The question of just when Latin America began to exhibit high inequality of incomes is under dispute. Robinson and Sokoloff (2004) and Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) argue that Latin America has been unequal for centuries, a result of the European conquest, the abundant natural resources (in particular minerals), and the comparative advantage of the region in the production of crops such as sugar. Williamson (2009) argues that "historical persistence in Latin American inequality is a myth" and that the region only became unusually unequal in the second half of the nineteenth century. 10 This estimate is based on our own calculations, using the data in Azevedo, Inchautse, and Sanfelice (2012) . See also Lustig, López-Calva, and Ortiz-Juárez (2013) .
Given the importance of labor incomes, in particular for the poor, on the distriGiven the importance of labor incomes, in particular for the poor, on the distribution of income, a number of studies have attempted to isolate the role that shifts bution of income, a number of studies have attempted to isolate the role that shifts in demand and supply have played in the changes in returns to schooling (Aedo in demand and supply have played in the changes in returns to schooling (Aedo and Walker 2012; Gasparini, Galiani, Cruces, and Acosta 2011; Manacorda, Sánchez-and Walker 2012; Gasparini, Galiani, Cruces, and Acosta 2011; Manacorda, Sánchez-Páramo, and Schady 2010) . These papers conclude that changes in the supply of Páramo, and Schady 2010) . These papers conclude that changes in the supply of workers with different amounts of education explain only a modest fraction of the workers with different amounts of education explain only a modest fraction of the changes in the skill premium observed in Latin America in the last three decades. changes in the skill premium observed in Latin America in the last three decades. Demand-side changes, in particular skill-biased technological change, substantially Demand-side changes, in particular skill-biased technological change, substantially increased the wage premium for workers with more education (especially university increased the wage premium for workers with more education (especially university education) in Latin America in the 1990s. education) in Latin America in the 1990s.
11 11 However, for reasons that are insuffiHowever, for reasons that are insufficiently understood, the effects of these demand-side shocks appear to have petered ciently understood, the effects of these demand-side shocks appear to have petered out by the 2000s. Institutional changes in the labor market were also important. The out by the 2000s. Institutional changes in the labor market were also important. The real minimum wage has increased substantially in some countries -by more than real minimum wage has increased substantially in some countries -by more than Of the various programs that directly redistribute resources to poor houseOf the various programs that directly redistribute resources to poor households in Latin America, the best known and most studied are targeted cash transfer holds in Latin America, the best known and most studied are targeted cash transfer programs, which were pioneered in the region and have become popular since programs, which were pioneered in the region and have become popular since the late 1990s. In these programs, eligibility is generally determined not by income the late 1990s. In these programs, eligibility is generally determined not by income directly, but by a composite measure of household characteristics, assets, and access directly, but by a composite measure of household characteristics, assets, and access to social services that are correlated with consumption or income. Some of these to social services that are correlated with consumption or income. Some of these programs, but not all, are "conditional cash transfers" that require households to programs, but not all, are "conditional cash transfers" that require households to comply with a number of conditions in return for the cash-generally, preventive comply with a number of conditions in return for the cash-generally, preventive health check-ups for children and pregnant mothers and attendance at school health check-ups for children and pregnant mothers and attendance at school for school-aged children. These conditional cash transfer programs are in some for school-aged children. These conditional cash transfer programs are in some cases quite large. Table 1 shows that in 16 countries, average coverage is one out of cases quite large. Table 1 shows that in 16 countries, average coverage is one out of every four households. Careful randomized evaluations of conditional cash transfer every four households. Careful randomized evaluations of conditional cash transfer programs in Latin America have shown that they have substantially increased school programs in Latin America have shown that they have substantially increased school enrollment and attendance, and preventive health care utilization (Fiszbein and enrollment and attendance, and preventive health care utilization (Fiszbein and Schady 2009 , and the references therein). Children in benefi ciary households , and the references therein). Children in benefi ciary households complete more schooling-for example, Behrman, Parker, and Todd (2011) complete more schooling-for example, Behrman, Parker, and Todd (2011) conclude that three years of conclude that three years of PROGRESA transfers in Mexico result in approximately transfers in Mexico result in approximately 0.3 more years of completed schooling (relative to no transfers). Conditional cash 0.3 more years of completed schooling (relative to no transfers). Conditional cash transfers have also had substantial effects on poverty and inequality. transfers have also had substantial effects on poverty and inequality.
While conditional cash transfers have clearly had overall positive effects, there While conditional cash transfers have clearly had overall positive effects, there are three main concerns. First, while cash transfer programs have increased school are three main concerns. First, while cash transfer programs have increased school enrollment, the evidence on whether the additional schooling results in better enrollment, the evidence on whether the additional schooling results in better learning outcomes for children who were brought into school by these programs learning outcomes for children who were brought into school by these programs is mixed. In Nicaragua, Barham, Macours, and Maluccio (2013) fi nd that boys is mixed. In Nicaragua, Barham, Macours, and Maluccio (2013) fi nd that boys (but not girls) whose families received transfers from the (but not girls) whose families received transfers from the Red de Protección Social program when they were between 9 and 11 years of age have test scores that are program when they were between 9 and 11 years of age have test scores that are approximately 0.2 standard deviations higher ten years later; in Mexico, Behrman, approximately 0.2 standard deviations higher ten years later; in Mexico, Behrman, Parker, and Todd (2009) fi nd that children who received Parker, and Todd (2009) fi nd that children who received PROGRESA transfers do transfers do not have higher test scores than comparable children who did not receive them. not have higher test scores than comparable children who did not receive them. Although the reasons for this fi nding are unclear, the poor quality of education and Although the reasons for this fi nding are unclear, the poor quality of education and the fact that many of the children who were brought into school are drawn from the the fact that many of the children who were brought into school are drawn from the lower end of the distribution of ability are probably part of the explanation. lower end of the distribution of ability are probably part of the explanation.
12 12 More More generally, while conditional cash transfers have increased the utilization of health generally, while conditional cash transfers have increased the utilization of health and educational services, impacts on fi nal human capital outcomes have been more and educational services, impacts on fi nal human capital outcomes have been more limited. As a result, the effect that conditional cash transfers have on reducing the limited. As a result, the effect that conditional cash transfers have on reducing the intergenerational transmission of poverty-a key objective of these programs-may intergenerational transmission of poverty-a key objective of these programs-may be limited (Levy 2007) . be limited (Levy 2007) .
Second, the transfers may in some cases be so large that they can have a negaSecond, the transfers may in some cases be so large that they can have a negative effect on incentives to work. Figure 5 presents the evolution of transfers for four tive effect on incentives to work. Figure 5 presents the evolution of transfers for four of the biggest cash transfer programs in Latin America. In Ecuador and Mexico, of the biggest cash transfer programs in Latin America. In Ecuador and Mexico, transfers have increased substantially in magnitude. In Mexico's transfers have increased substantially in magnitude. In Mexico's PROGRESA, since , since renamed renamed Oportunidades, transfers are now equivalent to over 40 percent of house-, transfers are now equivalent to over 40 percent of household pretransfer income in the lowest quintile of the distribution. Transfer income hold pretransfer income in the lowest quintile of the distribution. Transfer income also represents a sizeable share of total income in Ecuador, where the program is also represents a sizeable share of total income in Ecuador, where the program is also very large in scope, covering almost 40 percent of the population. If leisure also very large in scope, covering almost 40 percent of the population. If leisure is a normal good, we might expect that the income effect of transfers of this magniis a normal good, we might expect that the income effect of transfers of this magnitude would reduce labor supply. tude would reduce labor supply.
13 13 Moreover, many of the cash transfer programs Moreover, many of the cash transfer programs in Latin America periodically "recertify" benefi ciaries to ensure that they are still in Latin America periodically "recertify" benefi ciaries to ensure that they are still poor, to qualify for continued eligibility. This obviously introduces an incentive for poor, to qualify for continued eligibility. This obviously introduces an incentive for households to continue to be (or at least appear to be) poor. Camacho and Conover households to continue to be (or at least appear to be) poor. Camacho and Conover (2011) show that, once the exact formula used to calculate the proxy means test (2011) show that, once the exact formula used to calculate the proxy means test that determined eligibility for Colombia's that determined eligibility for Colombia's Familas en Acción program was made program was made public, there was substantial heaping of households just below the cutoff value. In public, there was substantial heaping of households just below the cutoff value. In Chile (and in some other countries), having a household member with a physical Chile (and in some other countries), having a household member with a physical 12 The evidence on this point from developing countries outside the region is also mixed. Filmer and Schady (2009) analyze the effect of a conditional cash transfer-like program in Cambodia. They fi nd no effect of transfers on test scores, in spite of large effects on school enrollment and years of completed schooling. Baird, McIntosh, and Ozler (2011) analyze a pilot program in Malawi which randomly assigned children to conditional transfers, unconditional transfers, and a control group. The conditional transfer had a larger effect on school enrollment than the unconditional transfer, and the conditional transfer (but not the unconditional transfer) had a positive, but modest effect on test scores. 13 Results from early evaluations of conditional cash transfers in Latin America suggest that adults in recipient households generally did not reduce labor supply in response to transfers (Alzúa, Cruces, and Ripani forthcoming; Skoufi as and Di Maro 2008; Parker and Skoufi as 2000). It is not clear, however, whether these results hold for programs that have been in place for a decade or longer, and given that transfer amounts have increased. Indeed, the evidence on noncontributory pensions in Latin America, discussed above, as well as the ample literature on welfare programs in the United States, all suggest that reductions in labor supply are a real possibility. or mental disability increases the value on the proxy means, and this is well known. or mental disability increases the value on the proxy means, and this is well known. Herrera, Larrañaga, and Telias (2010) show that, among the poorest households, Herrera, Larrañaga, and Telias (2010) show that, among the poorest households, almost 80 percent report having a household member with a disability on the almost 80 percent report having a household member with a disability on the Ficha de Protección Social, the survey that is used to construct the proxy means. In , the survey that is used to construct the proxy means. In comparison, on the national CASEN household survey, which does not determine comparison, on the national CASEN household survey, which does not determine eligibility for transfers, about 20 percent of the poorest households report having a eligibility for transfers, about 20 percent of the poorest households report having a member with a disability. member with a disability.
Third, conditional cash transfers can also favor informal over formal employThird, conditional cash transfers can also favor informal over formal employment (in addition to the effects of contributory and noncontributory social insurance ment (in addition to the effects of contributory and noncontributory social insurance programs discussed earlier). The Uruguayan programs discussed earlier). The Uruguayan PANES program explicitly disqualifi ed program explicitly disqualifi ed recipients if their formal sector earnings increased above a predetermined value. recipients if their formal sector earnings increased above a predetermined value. Amarante, Manacorda, Vigorito, and Zerpa (2011) show that Amarante, Manacorda, Vigorito, and Zerpa (2011) show that PANES substantially substantially reduced formal employment among men and that these effects persisted at least reduced formal employment among men and that these effects persisted at least two years after the program ended. two years after the program ended.
Despite the amount of attention from academics and policymakers, neither Despite the amount of attention from academics and policymakers, neither cash transfers nor noncontributory pensions are always the largest programs that cash transfers nor noncontributory pensions are always the largest programs that seek to redistribute resources to the poor in Latin America. In many countries, seek to redistribute resources to the poor in Latin America. In many countries, transfers to transfers to all households through subsidies to energy prices, or exemptions on households through subsidies to energy prices, or exemptions on consumption or value-added taxes on particular goods (usually food, medicines, consumption or value-added taxes on particular goods (usually food, medicines, or transport) absorb a larger share of the budget than either cash transfers or or transport) absorb a larger share of the budget than either cash transfers or noncontributory social insurance, or both. In Venezuela, energy subsidies reprenoncontributory social insurance, or both. In Venezuela, energy subsidies represent 6.9 percent of GDP; in Ecuador 6.4 percent; in the Dominican Republic sent 6.9 percent of GDP; in Ecuador 6.4 percent; in the Dominican Republic Exemptions from value-added taxes cost around 2 percent of GDP in Costa Exemptions from value-added taxes cost around 2 percent of GDP in Costa Rica, Mexico, Colombia, and Guatemala, 1.6 percent in Peru and Ecuador, and Rica, Mexico, Colombia, and Guatemala, 1.6 percent in Peru and Ecuador, and 0.8 percent in Argentina (Corbacho, Cibils, and Lora 2013) . Because richer house-0.8 percent in Argentina (Corbacho, Cibils, and Lora 2013) . Because richer households spend more in absolute value on electricity, cooking oil, and gasoline as holds spend more in absolute value on electricity, cooking oil, and gasoline as well as on tax-exempt goods like food and medicine, these subsidies and exempwell as on tax-exempt goods like food and medicine, these subsidies and exemptions disproportionately benefi t better-off households. In Mexico, the residential tions disproportionately benefi t better-off households. In Mexico, the residential electricity subsidy is larger than the budget of electricity subsidy is larger than the budget of Oportunidades, yet 57 percent of the , yet 57 percent of the electricity subsidy goes to households in the top two income quintiles, compared electricity subsidy goes to households in the top two income quintiles, compared with about 6 percent for the lowest one. Universal subsidies and tax exemptions with about 6 percent for the lowest one. Universal subsidies and tax exemptions are very ineffi cient ways of redistributing resources to the poor. are very ineffi cient ways of redistributing resources to the poor.
In sum, about half of the reduction in inequality in Latin America in the last In sum, about half of the reduction in inequality in Latin America in the last decade has occurred for reasons other than the expansion in the coverage of social decade has occurred for reasons other than the expansion in the coverage of social programs. Declines in the returns to education and the resulting increase in the programs. Declines in the returns to education and the resulting increase in the share of total labor income among the poor have been particularly important. share of total labor income among the poor have been particularly important. However, social programs, especially conditional cash transfers, have also played However, social programs, especially conditional cash transfers, have also played a role. That said, and recognizing the variations across countries, the scope for a role. That said, and recognizing the variations across countries, the scope for additional redistribution through cash transfers or noncontributory pensions additional redistribution through cash transfers or noncontributory pensions appears limited, because increasing the value of the transfers is likely to have appears limited, because increasing the value of the transfers is likely to have increasingly negative effects on the labor supply of recipients, accentuate distorincreasingly negative effects on the labor supply of recipients, accentuate distortions between the informal and formal labor market, or affect incentives to save. tions between the informal and formal labor market, or affect incentives to save. This argument does not imply that the region should abandon efforts to further This argument does not imply that the region should abandon efforts to further reduce poverty and inequality. Instead, it suggests that other policies are likely to reduce poverty and inequality. Instead, it suggests that other policies are likely to be more effective in the future. At present, personal income taxes in Latin America be more effective in the future. At present, personal income taxes in Latin America are among the lowest in the world, collecting only 1.4 percent of GDP versus an are among the lowest in the world, collecting only 1.4 percent of GDP versus an average of 8.4 percent of GDP in developed countries (Corbacho, Cibils, and average of 8.4 percent of GDP in developed countries (Corbacho, Cibils, and Lora 2013) . Increasing tax revenues, particularly from higher-income households, Lora 2013). Increasing tax revenues, particularly from higher-income households, would contribute to lower inequality. In parallel, the region could benefi t from would contribute to lower inequality. In parallel, the region could benefi t from redirecting some of the resources now channeled through generalized energy redirecting some of the resources now channeled through generalized energy subsidies and exemptions from value-added taxes to invest more in early childhood subsidies and exemptions from value-added taxes to invest more in early childhood development, design effective labor training programs, or fund health and other development, design effective labor training programs, or fund health and other components of social insurance for all workers, regardless of their labor status. components of social insurance for all workers, regardless of their labor status. These are all measures that would increase incomes, particularly incomes of poor These are all measures that would increase incomes, particularly incomes of poor households, via the route of higher productivity. households, via the route of higher productivity.
Conclusions
Although many factors have been at play, increased social spending and Although many factors have been at play, increased social spending and new social programs have helped to reduce poverty and inequality across Latin new social programs have helped to reduce poverty and inequality across Latin America. What accounts for these changes in social policy in the last two decades? America. What accounts for these changes in social policy in the last two decades? We highlight three important explanations. First, the emergence of more We highlight three important explanations. First, the emergence of more democratic regimes in the 1990s renewed political pressures to respond to unacdemocratic regimes in the 1990s renewed political pressures to respond to unacceptable levels of poverty and inequality, in particular after the "lost" decade of ceptable levels of poverty and inequality, in particular after the "lost" decade of the 1980s. Second, greater macroeconomic stability facilitated growth, providing the 1980s. Second, greater macroeconomic stability facilitated growth, providing fi scal revenues to increase spending (aided in some cases by favorable internafi scal revenues to increase spending (aided in some cases by favorable international conditions); it also allowed policymakers to focus on issues other than the tional conditions); it also allowed policymakers to focus on issues other than the latest adjustment program with the International Monetary Fund. Third, there latest adjustment program with the International Monetary Fund. Third, there was a recognition that traditional social programs had had only limited success. was a recognition that traditional social programs had had only limited success. In contexts of high informality, contributory social insurance had failed to protect In contexts of high informality, contributory social insurance had failed to protect the majority of households from risks; in countries with high income inequality the majority of households from risks; in countries with high income inequality (that is, most of Latin America), generalized subsidies were mostly captured by (that is, most of Latin America), generalized subsidies were mostly captured by higher income groups. Lessons from the past were converted into pioneering higher income groups. Lessons from the past were converted into pioneering initiatives to provide households in the informal sector with health services (like initiatives to provide households in the informal sector with health services (like Colombia's Colombia's Régimen Subsidiado) and pensions (like Brazil's ) and pensions (like Brazil's Previdência Rural); or to ); or to focus income transfers on the poor while turning them into investments in their focus income transfers on the poor while turning them into investments in their human capital (like Mexico's human capital (like Mexico's PROGRESA). ).
As a result of faster growth, more social spending and new programs, millions As a result of faster growth, more social spending and new programs, millions of Latin Americans are now eating better, attaining more schooling, enjoying of Latin Americans are now eating better, attaining more schooling, enjoying improved access to health services, and having higher incomes during old age. The improved access to health services, and having higher incomes during old age. The region's "middle class"-those living in households with income per capita between region's "middle class"-those living in households with income per capita between $10 and $50 (in US dollars) per day-increased from 20 to 30 percent of the popu-$10 and $50 (in US dollars) per day-increased from 20 to 30 percent of the population between 1990 and 2010, and their share in national income increased from lation between 1990 and 2010, and their share in national income increased from 40 to 50 percent (Ferreira, Messina, Rigolini, López-Calva, Lugo, and Vakis 2012) . 40 to 50 percent (Ferreira, Messina, Rigolini, López-Calva, Lugo, and Vakis 2012) . These economic and social developments offer a more fertile ground where the These economic and social developments offer a more fertile ground where the rule of law and stronger institutions can develop deeper roots. rule of law and stronger institutions can develop deeper roots.
Has a turning point been reached? Has Latin America put in place policies to Has a turning point been reached? Has Latin America put in place policies to sustain faster rates of growth and higher real incomes, based more on increasing sustain faster rates of growth and higher real incomes, based more on increasing productivity and less on the gains derived from macroeconomic stability and productivity and less on the gains derived from macroeconomic stability and favorable Asian winds? Put differently, can the region in the next decades reach favorable Asian winds? Put differently, can the region in the next decades reach incomes per capita on par with, say, Korea, or rather will it be caught in a "middle incomes per capita on par with, say, Korea, or rather will it be caught in a "middle income trap"-more stable and less poor, but not truly prosperous and equitable? income trap"-more stable and less poor, but not truly prosperous and equitable? On this key question, the jury is still out. On this key question, the jury is still out.
There is much that Latin America can and should do to build truly prosperous There is much that Latin America can and should do to build truly prosperous and equitable societies. Critically, in our view, the region needs to recognize that and equitable societies. Critically, in our view, the region needs to recognize that faster growth requires improved productivity, not just factor accumulation and faster growth requires improved productivity, not just factor accumulation and favorable international conditions. In parallel, the region needs a deeper underfavorable international conditions. In parallel, the region needs a deeper understanding of the factors limiting productivity growth and the policy reforms required standing of the factors limiting productivity growth and the policy reforms required to stimulate it. We believe that at present there is no consensus across Latin America to stimulate it. We believe that at present there is no consensus across Latin America that accelerating productivity growth is essential to achieving faster growth, and that accelerating productivity growth is essential to achieving faster growth, and even less consensus as to what policies are needed to accomplish it. This situation even less consensus as to what policies are needed to accomplish it. This situation stands in contrast with the consensus that emerged two decades ago that macroecostands in contrast with the consensus that emerged two decades ago that macroeconomic stability was essential to resuming growth, and that sound monetary policy nomic stability was essential to resuming growth, and that sound monetary policy and prudent fi scal management were needed to deliver stability. and prudent fi scal management were needed to deliver stability.
What role does social policy play in all this? First and foremost, it should be What role does social policy play in all this? First and foremost, it should be concerned with raising social welfare. More educated citizens will result in a better concerned with raising social welfare. More educated citizens will result in a better informed electorate and, more generally, in improved institutions. Broader protecinformed electorate and, more generally, in improved institutions. Broader protections against risks and wider opportunities will help to reverse disparities that, sadly, tions against risks and wider opportunities will help to reverse disparities that, sadly, have for too long been Latin America's trademark. But social policy, in our view, have for too long been Latin America's trademark. But social policy, in our view, should also contribute to productivity growth, or at least not hinder it. In the end, should also contribute to productivity growth, or at least not hinder it. In the end, one cannot sustain a welfare state on stagnant productivity, particularly since the one cannot sustain a welfare state on stagnant productivity, particularly since the costs of that welfare state will increase rapidly as the region's population ages and costs of that welfare state will increase rapidly as the region's population ages and its epidemiological profi le evolves towards more costly pathologies. We want the its epidemiological profi le evolves towards more costly pathologies. We want the humanistic and civic value of education, but Latin America also needs competent humanistic and civic value of education, but Latin America also needs competent engineers, nurses, and computer programmers; we want protection against risks, but engineers, nurses, and computer programmers; we want protection against risks, but Latin America also need fi rms and workers that pay taxes, invest in labor training Latin America also need fi rms and workers that pay taxes, invest in labor training and innovate; we want less poverty, but Latin America also needs to avoid permaand innovate; we want less poverty, but Latin America also needs to avoid permanent welfare dependency and unduly reduced participation rates. Higher average nent welfare dependency and unduly reduced participation rates. Higher average per capita incomes are needed if only to provide the revenue base from which social per capita incomes are needed if only to provide the revenue base from which social programs can be fi nanced-a key point in a region that in the past suffered much programs can be fi nanced-a key point in a region that in the past suffered much from unsustainable fi scal defi cits. from unsustainable fi scal defi cits.
Social policy needs to change because, as we have argued, at present it is only Social policy needs to change because, as we have argued, at present it is only partly effective in reaching its direct objective of higher welfare, but also because it partly effective in reaching its direct objective of higher welfare, but also because it is making an insuffi cient contribution to productivity growth (and in some cases, is making an insuffi cient contribution to productivity growth (and in some cases, is working against it). More particularly, social policy in Latin America needs to is working against it). More particularly, social policy in Latin America needs to address four challenges. First, it needs to increase abilities among children and address four challenges. First, it needs to increase abilities among children and young adults, to create the skilled workforce that can support sustained productivity young adults, to create the skilled workforce that can support sustained productivity growth. Of particular relevance are interventions that seek to ensure that poor chilgrowth. Of particular relevance are interventions that seek to ensure that poor children do not fall behind at early ages in terms of their nutrition and cognitive and dren do not fall behind at early ages in terms of their nutrition and cognitive and noncognitive development. Put differently, there is not enough "pre-distribution" noncognitive development. Put differently, there is not enough "pre-distribution" (to borrow a term from in the form of investments early on. These (to borrow a term from in the form of investments early on. These early investments need to be followed with education that is of higher quality. The early investments need to be followed with education that is of higher quality. The poor quality of teachers in many countries in Latin America requires better prepoor quality of teachers in many countries in Latin America requires better preservice and in-service training. But, we believe, it also requires greater fl exibility service and in-service training. But, we believe, it also requires greater fl exibility to reward good teachers and dismiss poor ones. In a recent paper on the United to reward good teachers and dismiss poor ones. In a recent paper on the United States, Rockoff and Staiger (2010) argued in this journal that, while teachers can States, Rockoff and Staiger (2010) argued in this journal that, while teachers can improve learning outcomes, the observable characteristics of teachers (including improve learning outcomes, the observable characteristics of teachers (including degrees, test scores and experience, at least after the fi rst two to three years) degrees, test scores and experience, at least after the fi rst two to three years) explain very little of the difference in their effectiveness. On this basis, Rockoff explain very little of the difference in their effectiveness. On this basis, Rockoff and Staiger propose a teacher selection system that requires few upfront teachingand Staiger propose a teacher selection system that requires few upfront teachingspecifi c investments, recruits widely, but gives tenure to only a very small minority specifi c investments, recruits widely, but gives tenure to only a very small minority of teachers. The conclusions of their analysis seem to us to be especially relevant of teachers. The conclusions of their analysis seem to us to be especially relevant for Latin America, where many teachers are ineffective but, thanks to very powerful for Latin America, where many teachers are ineffective but, thanks to very powerful unions in many countries, teachers often receive automatic tenure upon entering unions in many countries, teachers often receive automatic tenure upon entering the public education system. the public education system. Second, the coexistence of contributory and noncontributory social insurSecond, the coexistence of contributory and noncontributory social insurance is only partly effective in protecting workers against risks and does a poor ance is only partly effective in protecting workers against risks and does a poor job in smoothing consumption between work and retirement. Moreover, the job in smoothing consumption between work and retirement. Moreover, the way in which social insurance is fi nanced, including the use of cumbersome way in which social insurance is fi nanced, including the use of cumbersome mechanisms to protect against the risks of employment loss, distorts fi rm and mechanisms to protect against the risks of employment loss, distorts fi rm and worker behavior, and may also decrease long-term saving. Much research remains worker behavior, and may also decrease long-term saving. Much research remains to be done in this area, but these distortions could have substantial, negative to be done in this area, but these distortions could have substantial, negative consequences for productivity in Latin America. Correspondingly, reforms in consequences for productivity in Latin America. Correspondingly, reforms in the design of these programs could offer substantial benefi ts. Attention needs the design of these programs could offer substantial benefi ts. Attention needs to be focused on unifying the source of fi nancing for health insurance; more to be focused on unifying the source of fi nancing for health insurance; more generally, risks that are common to any form of employment should be fi nanced generally, risks that are common to any form of employment should be fi nanced from the same revenue source. Ineffi cient labor protection regulations should from the same revenue source. Ineffi cient labor protection regulations should be replaced by proper unemployment insurance. A clearer distinction should be be replaced by proper unemployment insurance. A clearer distinction should be made between the two objectives of pensions: Avoiding old-age poverty (which made between the two objectives of pensions: Avoiding old-age poverty (which can be ensured with a modest noncontributory pension that does not depend on can be ensured with a modest noncontributory pension that does not depend on whether a worker is in formal or informal employment, and may or may not be whether a worker is in formal or informal employment, and may or may not be means-tested), and smoothing consumption between work and retirement (which means-tested), and smoothing consumption between work and retirement (which will likely require reforms that seek to increase the coverage of the contributory will likely require reforms that seek to increase the coverage of the contributory pension system). Insofar as possible, pension programs should not distort laborpension system). Insofar as possible, pension programs should not distort laborleisure and formal-informal choices, and should not discourage long-term saving leisure and formal-informal choices, and should not discourage long-term saving in local currency. in local currency.
Third, while direct income transfers are clearly part of an effective social Third, while direct income transfers are clearly part of an effective social policy, transfer programs have their limits. Indeed, over-reliance on cash transfers policy, transfer programs have their limits. Indeed, over-reliance on cash transfers may hurt those that they are intended to help, and also depress productivity, if it may hurt those that they are intended to help, and also depress productivity, if it lowers labor market participation rates, increases informality, and results in longlowers labor market participation rates, increases informality, and results in longterm welfare dependency. Conditional cash transfers have also been used as a way term welfare dependency. Conditional cash transfers have also been used as a way of protecting households from temporary shocks, even though it is not clear that of protecting households from temporary shocks, even though it is not clear that they are the right instrument for this purpose. Many of the challenges faced by the they are the right instrument for this purpose. Many of the challenges faced by the current benefi ciaries of conditional cash transfer programs are better addressed current benefi ciaries of conditional cash transfer programs are better addressed by policies that improve the quality of services and the functioning of labor by policies that improve the quality of services and the functioning of labor markets. Given the coverage and transfer amounts in place in many countries markets. Given the coverage and transfer amounts in place in many countries today, further redistribution may be better accomplished by reforming personal today, further redistribution may be better accomplished by reforming personal income taxes, or by redirecting generalized subsidies embedded in energy prices income taxes, or by redirecting generalized subsidies embedded in energy prices and special tax regimes into investments in early childhood development, in and special tax regimes into investments in early childhood development, in labor training, or in improving the quality of health and education services. labor training, or in improving the quality of health and education services.
Finally, Latin America needs to ensure that its social programs, including Finally, Latin America needs to ensure that its social programs, including pensions, health care, cash transfers, and expenditures on education are fi scally pensions, health care, cash transfers, and expenditures on education are fi scally sustainable in the long run, and are not vulnerable to the vagaries of international sustainable in the long run, and are not vulnerable to the vagaries of international commodity prices. Governments should also make more explicit the link between commodity prices. Governments should also make more explicit the link between contributions and benefi ts in all social insurance programs, as this will help address contributions and benefi ts in all social insurance programs, as this will help address the political economy considerations that have driven the growth of benefi ts in the political economy considerations that have driven the growth of benefi ts in noncontributory systems (Antón, Hernández, and Levy 2012) . noncontributory systems (Antón, Hernández, and Levy 2012) .
The solutions to these problems are technically complex, and may need to be The solutions to these problems are technically complex, and may need to be implemented in a global economic context that is less favorable than it has been implemented in a global economic context that is less favorable than it has been in the recent past. But these complexities are dwarfed by the political challenges, in the recent past. But these complexities are dwarfed by the political challenges, as the needed reforms touch core fi bers of the region's social fabric: the relations as the needed reforms touch core fi bers of the region's social fabric: the relations between parents, teachers, and the government; subsidies and taxes; and the interbetween parents, teachers, and the government; subsidies and taxes; and the interactions between fi rms and workers in the labor market. The societal consensuses actions between fi rms and workers in the labor market. The societal consensuses that, after many painful crises, were built around the importance of prudent macrothat, after many painful crises, were built around the importance of prudent macroeconomic policies need to be extended to areas where vested interests and strongly economic policies need to be extended to areas where vested interests and strongly held beliefs make such consensuses more diffi cult to reach. held beliefs make such consensuses more diffi cult to reach. Behrman, Mariano Bosch, Guillermo Cruces, Francisco Ferreira, Luis Felipe López Calva, Eduardo Lora, Nora Lustig, Bill Maloney, Angel Melguizo, and Marcos Robles for many useful comments. We also thank the editors of The Journal of Economic Perspectives for their constructive suggestions.
